Indian Philosophy in its Divergence from the Spirit of the Contemporary West. by Schaub, Edward L.
INDIAN PHILOSOPHY IN ITS DIVERGENCE FROM THE
SPIRIT OF THE CONTEMPORARY \\'EST (I)
BY EDWARD L. SCHAUB
THE philosopher Fichte spoke from deUberate conviction when
he variously declared that the kind of philosophy one chooses
depends upon the kind of person one is. To him it seemed
that, basically, there are two types of men, and two alone. This led
him to substitute for the threefold classification of philosophies
advanced by Kant, a dual division. Whereas his predecessor had
differentiated dogmatic, skeptical and critical philosophies, Fichte
insisted that every philosophical system is dominated either by an
insistence upon human freedom or by the thesis of universal de-
terminism. Given a man who exhibits intellectual spontaneity and
is aware thereof, and who possesses conscious aims which he
ardently pursues in the face of physical and mental lethargv and of
environmental oppositions; given a man who is genuinely self-
conscious, self-directing and self-critical, who sifts data for their
truth value and reaches out in intellectual exploration, and who
passes judgment upon himself and his world; given a self who is
truly in possession of himself, and we have a person who is in-
vincibly committed to a metaphysics and a social philosophy of
freedom. Such a person can understand why the one of the con-
trary type holds to the view he does. He can understand why one
who has never with freedom acquired selfhood and spontaneitv, and
who consequentl}' identifies himself with substances and things,
inevitably maintains what Fichte variously characterized as a sub-
stantive, a materialistic, and a deterministic world-view. But as to
the error of this view the self-consciously free spirit is as fully
convinced as he is luminously aware of its causes.
These contentions of Fichte obviously grow out of an interpreta-
tion of the self that is essentially individualistic, and the present
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writer, for one, finds much of value in them. They should, however,
not obscure the fact that for certain purposes it may be more
significant to trace differences in world-views along other lines. It
may not be gainsaid that philosoph}- in general feeds upon the
concrete facts of life, and reckons with the numerous areas of ex-
perience organized through the operation of practical and theoretical
interests. Man, for example, requires food, shelter, and safety, and
these he must win through practical adjustments to and through
manipulation of his environment. The most advanced as well as the
most primitive thus possess habits, aptitudes, systems of practices
and bodies of ideas that constitute an important sector of life.
This sector is social in the sense that it has acquired its character
through activities in which the individual has co-operated with his
fellows, and through the pressure of traditions and norms sustained
by the group. As moulded by the features of the real world in which
life is carried on, it may be differentiated from a set of ideas and
practices, from myths, tales and taboos, which arise from the play
of imagination that is largely uncontrolled by the stubborn actual-
ities of the existing environment, and that assume organization
through the forces of fear and other emotions of thwarted and
half-formed desires, of hopes and present needs. Still again, in
the history of human culture there gradually emerge a variety of
activities, a body of ideas, and a characteristic outlook—a sector of
experience—that we have come to call aesthetic. This, in turn, may
be demarcated from sets of interest that are theoretic and scientific,
or more stricth' social and ethical, or essentially religious and
cosmic.
Xow philosoph}' may not safely neglect an\- phase of human
experience. It becomes significant in proportion to the compre-
hensiveness, as well, of course, as to the success with which it in-
terprets and synthesizes the facts, and more particularly the organ-
izing interests and categories, of all the departments of individual-
social life and thought. But philosophers, like other people, see
and achieve only in part. As a matter of fact, their conclusions
take shape under the predominating influence now of this and again
of another field of concrete experience. According to the latter,
therefore, and to the range and degree of the organization of the
facts that fall therein, will be the resultant world-view, or at least
certain important features of this view that enable us significantly
to compare and to contrast it with rival doctrines. Among different
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peoples, and at different epochs, however, different areas of activit\
and interest have tended to exercise the dominant role. To the
extent that this has occurred, we are apt to hnd more or less general
drifts in those systems of ideals and facts that comprise the world-
view.
If we keep in mind these facts, an interesting and a significant
contrast is revealed when we compare, in a very large and general
way, the contemporary thought currents of the West, and par-
ticularly of America, with the outlook which is often broadl)' char-
acterized as Indian. The former, it becomes clear, have their basis,
to a unique degree, in the experiences of practical and ethical life
and activity, and find their logical orientation primarily in science,
more specifically in the natural sciences ; the latter, on the other
hand, is peculiarly dominated by features of the religious conscious-
ness. As a confirmatory fact, it might be pointed out that in so far
as our own present American philosophy ventures at all beyond the
technical consideration of particular problems to broad metaphysical
construction, or to a comprehensive social philosophy, it in the main
does so without first consulting the deliverances of the specificall\-
religious consciousness. Even philosophical interpretations of re-
ligion are in a large measure based upon metaphysical conclusions
derived from sources which, however extensive, fail to include the
facts of religious experience or the generalizations reached through
a comparative, historical or psychological study of them. That re-
ligious attitudes and expressions represent facts, and that the com-
parative, historical, sociological and psychological treatments of
them offer considerations, no less significant for the larger tasks
of philosophy than other facts and other methodically reached con-
siderations, seems to be c|uite disregarded by perhaps even the
majority of our \\'estern thinkers. In the case of India, on the other
hand, the articulation of philosophy and religion seems so close at
times as to defy any clear separation of the two. Religion, it would
seem, has continued to be perhaps the chief cultural influence, and
the primary source of the content as well as the inspiration of
philosophy, while the latter has discharged its debt by transforming
and yet sustaining, by purging and yet confirming, the pivotal
affirmations of the religious consciousness. Garbe has even con-
tended, with respect to India, that "not only has the most absolute
freedom of thought always prevailed, but also philosophical specula-
tion, even in its boldest forms, has placed itself in accord w'ith the
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popular religion to an extent never ai,Min realized on earth between
these two powers. "•
The contrast thus alleged demands elaboration, and the affirma-
tion of its existence requires defense. Especially is this the case
because the allegation is made in the face of a i)enetrating studv
which Professor Radhakrishnan has recently published under the
title. The Reign of Religion in Contemporary Philosophy. In this
volume, Professor Radhakrishnan deals with the pluralistic s} stems
lately current in Western philosophw lie points out the \va\- in
which they diverge from what he considers to be the natural con-
clusion of sound, impartial philosophizing, namel\-, monistic idealism.
These deviations he then ascribes to what he calls the "reign of re-
ligion" but characterizes as "the interference of religious prejudice."
It might thus >eem that Professor Radhakrishnan finds religion
potent precisely where we have just declared it to pla\- a relatively
subordinate part ; and it might further seem that, whereas he regards
as deleterious that impact of religion which he discovers, we shall
intimate it to be a loss that the influence of religion upon our thought
and culture is not relatively greater than it appears to be. Instead
of indicating any strictures we might have upon the conclusions of
Professor Radhakrishnan. or of entering upon an examination of
the extent to which that which we ha\e already said or ma\- still
ha\e to sa}' does ultimately diverge from his conclusions, let us
merely point out that, while Professor Radhakrishnan's primarv,
e\"en though not exclusive, gaze is upon Europe, our jioint of fixation
i- America, with Europe as marginal. ]\Ioreover. while he singles
out for consideration those philosophical systems which expovmd
pluralistic theism, we shall be concerned not with these exclusively
but more generally with such liberalistic and humanistic doctrines as
seem most clearly to reflect and most directl}' to afl:ect our present
cultural life. Furthermore, and more importantp-, the term 're-
ligion" as used by Professor Radhakrishnan does not designate the
same form of consciousness or body of facts which we have in mind.
Let us then undertake an inspection of the religious conscious-
ness, directing our attention particularly to some lines of considera-
tion connected with its salient features. \\'hile we shall aspire to
all possible brevity in our description, some amount of detail and of
elaboration will be necessary if we are to realize our aim of prepar-
ing the way for what we shall wish to emphasize, in the paper which
1 Garbe. The Philosophy of Aiiciciif India, p. 24.
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is to follow, in connection with Indian philosophy. Now, religion,
obviously, is psychologically an extremely complicated phenomenon.
Anthropologically and sociologically, it has appeared in an enormous
variety of forms, widely divergent whether we pay regard to its
cognitive, conative, or emotional phases, to its myths and creeds, its
cults and impact upon life, or its reverberations in the feelings of
its devotees. Historically, it has exhibited change and growth which,
though perhaps not as rapid as the transformations in other phases
of culture, are nevertheless as deep-going. Religion, in its factual
as distinguished from its normative connotation, therefore repre-
sents a domain in which every generalization, like all dehnition.
suffers from a certain degree of arbitrariness, and thus lays itself
open-to possible objection.
Little, therefore, may be predicated of religion if the predication
is intended as sweepingly universal. Nevertheless, one may with
some assurance insist that in the main, whether in its more primitive
or its more advanced forms, the religious consciousness involves as
one of its features man's awareness that he is living in a power-
world, and that he must orient and adjust himself thereto as best
he may. The controlling power or powers, as he indeed with some
measure of clearness realizes, are but inadequately understood by
him, or are perhaps even deemed to be incomprehensible. Yet he
is convinced of their existence, and at every given time he believes
that he knows so much of their character as is implied by acts and
attitudes to which he has been led, and to which he subsequently
feels constrained, in relation to them. Religion, that is to say—at
least in the greater number of cases—is an experience in which the
individual, as a psychological matter of fact, is conscious of an
objective realit\', and of the fact that an essential feature of this
reality is its extraordinary power, a power supernormal in its degree
and portentous in its bearing upon the well-being of the individual
and his group. Indeed, subject to the reservations always necessary
when speaking of religion in general, one may safely say that it
involves man's conscious and practical attitude to the realit\- that for
him is ultimate, and that is peculiarly and mysteriously related to
the events of nature and to man's vital concerns.
Such being the case, the reality with which the religious
consciousness is concerned is by it conceived in terms not alone of
power but also of value. This aspect of value, indeed, has of late
received increasing recognition. Whether under the influence of
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Ritschlians and other post-Kantians, or of Hoeffding's fruitful
thesis that rehgion is essentiail}- faith in the conservation of vahies,
or whether because of vohintaristic psychologies which give to in-
terests a priority over ideas, recent students of religion have even
tended to stress its value aspect to the point of one-sitledness.
It is our contention that the object of which the individual is
conscious in his religious experience possesses for him the attributes
both of power and of value. It is supremely real, if indeed it is not
the ultimate being; it is practically significant : it more and more
acquires the traits deemed loftiest at the time ; eventualK' it becomes
the indissoluble synthesis of the irrefragably real and the trul}- ideal.
Kant resolved the basic human questions into three : what can I
know, what ought I to do, and what may I hope. These questions
are all of serious moment to the genuine religious consciousness. In
its most highly developed forms, pronouncedly when its mystical
element comes to the fore, it insists that absolute truth is attainable
(though—be it marked—in the specific sense only that ultimate
reality is accessible to man), that duty is not an illusion, and that
desire, wdien conscious of its deepest requirements, may be funda-
mentally satisfied. A completely ascendent religious mvsticism
affirms a type of experience which fulfills man's supreme cognitive
aims and also his desiderative and volitional life. Difficult paradoxes
and intellectual puzzlements here present themselves. These center
about the fact that actualities, as Baldwin develops in considerable
detail in his Genetic Logic, "are what we discover, whether we de-
sire them or not," whereas desire looms large in the texture of
ideals. In the teeth of all difficulties, however, religion has tended
stubbornly to resist any suggestion that it relinquish in its object
the aspect either of actuality or of value. Both power and good-
ness, it firmly maintains, are essential to its object.
The religious consciousness, therefore, is not to be interpreted,
as it so commonly has been of late, in terms of escape from reality.
The very contrary is the case. Religion is an earnest and a stubborn
C[uest for truth and reality. It is convinced that anv conception
which reason shows to the untenable must be discarded, however
deeply it may have become rooted in emotion and life. For, it is
staunch in the faith that only the real can completelv and per-
manently satisfy that which is deepest in us. In matters of creed,
as w^ell as of feeling and practical concern^ it voices the determina-
tion expressed in Job's tragically heroic resolve that "though He
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slav me, vet will I trust Him." The developed religious con-
sciousness would seem to acquiesce only in that which most fully,
indeed which completel}', satisfies man's deepest recpurements.
Its object is one believed to interpret the courses of histor\'
and of nature, to embody whatever man's self-conscious reason
leads him to value and reverence, and to guarantee unalloyed
bliss. It may, to repeat, not be denied that such a faith sets to
philosophy tasks of extraordinary, if not completely baffling, com-
plexity. And it must be confessed that not even a Plato, and no
subsequent philosopher, has as yet resolved with more than partial
success the various antinomies presented by religion. Nevertheless,
religion continues as a perpetual refusal to divorce power from
perfection, reality from ideality.
Xor will religion consent to a severance of its supremely real
and worthful object from the lives of finite individuals. On the
contrary, it declares the possibility of a human existence permeated
bv the divine spirit ; and such an existence it is disposed to require,
its conviction being that blindness and sinfulness are involved
whenever the finite reserves any remnant of himself in isolation from
the divine. To certain religious mystics, indeed, the life of man.
in its apical experiences certainl\-, if not throughout, represents the
very pulsations of God. Nevertheless, there are spiritual require-
ments which impel even the religious mystic to a contrary attitude,
to an advocacy of and a struggle for the jM-eservation of selfhood
and individuality. Here again paradoxes and moral perplexities are
engendered. The intellect is confronted with the perennial question,
in one of its aspects, of the one and the many. ^lorally, there is a
tension between the demand for the free determination and exercise
of dutv on the part of volitional agents and the craving for divine
guidance and control, or. at any rate, the need—if life is to be at its
fullest—for unreserved dedication to a superfinite which for the
individual must be the all in all.
The religious consciousness, thus, holds fast to various aftirma-
tions which to it are all fundamental even though they are not easil\-
reconciled. In its impact upon the philosophic quest, therefore, it
arouses deep discontent with metaphysical systems which adopt the
easy course of singling out and treating as basic certain s|)ecific fea-
tures of realitv and of disregarding all that seems incompatible there-
with. It challenges the thinker to a more catholic view and to more
arduous reflection; it stirs him to persist in the face of all obscurities
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and defiant difficulties, in order that his thought mav do justice to
the fullness of the reality which presents itself to the religious de-
votee in his most serious and most satisfying experience.
\\ ith this we pass to another of the lines of consideration alluded
to above. Religion, as just noted, disallows to philosophy any ready
acquiesence in results achieved through the neglect of central fea-
tures of experience. Thus it prods the philosopher on to perpetual
etforts. This it does also through a further influence to which we
now advert. Religion involves a consciousness that the ultimate
object transcends present comprehension. To quote from Rudolf
Otto's A\ifuraHsiu and Rcligioji, "religion seeks depth in things,
reaches out toward what is concealed, uncomprehended. m\steri(nis.
It is more than humility; it is piety. And piety is experience of
myster}-." Religion has repeated!}- proclaimed that the wavs of the
Divine are not our ways, as we have come to understand them ; nor
are its thoughts our thoughts. For it. the nature of the Divine is
not fully—or perhaps, as it is sometimes alleged, not at all—learned
by observation or analysis of any particular reality that has come
within our ken. Hence the Sorbonne was acting in defense of one
of the convictions of the religious consciousness at the time when
it rejected as heresy the doctrine that it is possible to "know" God.
Instructive at this point it is to note that A\'undt"s extensive re-
searches and penetrating psychological analvses as reported in his
\ olkerpsychologie led him to the doctrine that the god of religion
is a synthesis of the hero with that mysterious creation of the
emotions which he designated the 'demon.' The distinguished
American ps^xhologist of religion Leuba has also insisted that
"mysteriousness and avvefulness always belong to gods, and man's
relations with gods will be more or less deeply colored with awe."
Let the Divine receive embodiment in specific imager\- or material
representation, or let it acquire definite formulation in a creed, and
there is bound shortly to arise a vital religious spirit to declare that
that which was accepted as Divine is but an idol, a figment of an
all too limited experience and of a religious need but imperfectlv
conscious of its own requirements.
It is reported that Paul, coming in his long missionarv journevs
to Athens, found there among its several temples devoted to the
gods of Greek mythology, one dedicated to the unknown God. The
latter he sought to make known rmto the people. But even his all
but consummate genius failed. Of the Athenians, onlv a ver\- few
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seemed convinced; some mocked, and others, though stating that
they would hear him again on these matters, were left so unil-
lumined, and therefore apparently so indifferent, that Paul, in seem-
ing discouragement, departed from among them, leaving the folk
and their philosophers with the unknown God. \\'e allude to this
incident only for purposes of illustration. Is it not the case that,
whenever any advanced people have found themselves with specific-
ally imaged gods, or with such as were with considerable complete-
ness understood by them, they have become profoundly dissatisfied,
and have felt an irresistible impulse either to reject their deities or
to supplement them with a further god essentially vmknown?
True it is that all religions living for long in the spirits of men,
have affirmed various attributes of their gods as they have come to
know them through one form or another of revelation, or it matters
not how. But no less true is it that in one way or another, and at
some point or another, they have persistently and stoutly declared
that no human thoughts or finite consciousness may express the
nature of the religious object, that the Divine in its essential nature
as such is qualitatively other than the limited realities accessible to
our comprehension, is somehow genuinely transcendent of finite ex-
istence and of human apprehension.
It has often been noted that religion has been fed by man's sense
of the mysterious. Here we are concerned merely to suggest that
religion has in turn sustained that by which it has been nourished.
For the life of philosophy, this, as we shall in our concluding paper
observe, is a fact of no little moment. Epochs and peoples that
preserve a living nexus or osmosis between religion and philosophy
possess not only a religion but likewise a philosophy essentially other
than is to be found where the connection is weakened or severed.
In its most characteristic and lofty forms, then, the religious
consciousness postulates a reality that synthesizes being and value
;
it insists upon a union of the human and the divine; and it is sensi-
tively alive to the fact of an uncomprehended, if not incompre-
hensible, presence, and to the lure of the mysterious in nature and
human experience. Its source is in the stirrings of a dissatisfied or
rent soul; its emphasis oscillates between the attitude of the self to
its world and the bearing of the world upon the self; its promise is
salvation and realization.
To be sure, the term religion covers a great variety of phe-
nomena. In part the variations are due to the fact that in its
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relation to other elements of the cultural life, as well as to philos-
ophy, religion has in some cases been primarily active and formative.
and has therefore preserved its essential integrity ; whereas, in other
cases, the conditions are reversed—numerous cultural elements have
developed in considerable independence of religion and have in the
course of time put their stamp upon the latter. Thus, the religious
outlook of India has pretty much preserved its unique—and not
merely its traditional
—
quality, and its essential integrity; that of
present day America, on the other hand, is strongly dominated by
the influences of industrialism, of the democratic ideal of society,
and of ethical requirements. In the former case, religion's function
is connected with man's endeavor to transcend the world and his
own present state of being; in the latter case, it is widely held that
the proper aim of religion (as indeed only less fully that of philos-
ophy ) is to effect desirable changes in the phy>ical and the social
environment.
Generalizations, to be sure, are perilous and they become doubly
so when employed in the drawing of contrasts or even of compari-
sons. Yet, when we consider what is typically Indian in relation to
what is today generally prevalent in America, certain important
dififerences emerge, at least in degree of emphasis, as respects the
relations of philosophy and culture to religion.
How the features of the religious consciousness as sketched
above have reflected themselves in the philosophy of India and
have thus led to a divergence of the latter from the spirit of the
contemporary A\'est. will appear in some detail in the second part
of our studv.
